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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT COVINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-219-WOB
SARAH JONES
VS.

PLAINTIFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION

DIRTY WORLD
ENTERTAINMENT
RECORDINGS, LLC, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

Background
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence in
the second trial of this case, the defendants made a timely
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50.
The motion was primarily based on the argument that
the defendants were immune under the Communications Decency
Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.

The Court denied the motion

for the same reasons expressed in its earlier opinion
addressing this issue.

See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t

Recordings, LLC, 840 F.Supp.2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
The jury hung in the first trial of this case, which
necessitated a second trial.

The evidence in both trials

regarding the claimed immunity was essentially the same as
that described in the Court’s earlier opinion.

The case

was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for the

Case: 2:09-cv-00219-WOB-CJS Doc #: 210 Filed: 08/12/13 Page: 2 of 12 - Page ID#:
3139

plaintiff for $38,000.00 compensatory damages and
$300,000.00 punitive damages.1

(Doc. 207).

The Court now files this supplemental Memorandum
Opinion to explain further its reasons for denying
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Analysis
A.

The precedents support the proposition that the CDA
provides only a sort of qualified immunity that can be
lost by the site’s intentionally developing and/or
materially contributing to the illegal or
objectionable material.
Throughout these proceedings, counsel for defendants

has argued that no rational court could deny CDA immunity
in this case, and that defendants’ claim for immunity was
required by all existing precedents.

1

Defendants, apparently relying solely on their immunity
defense, concede the propriety of these amounts since they
chose not to file a motion for a new trial under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(a). See Young v. Langley, 793 F.2d 792, 794
(6th Cir. 1986) (“This court may not review the alleged
excessiveness of verdicts absent a timely motion for new
trial and the trial court’s ruling thereon.”). Failure to
file such a motion also precludes appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence. See Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co., 510 F.3d 661, 665 (6th Cir. 2008); Pennington v.
Western Atlas, Inc., 202 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2000);
Young, 793 F.2d at 794. See generally 12 Moore’s Federal
Practice § 59.55 (3d ed. 2013) (“Grounds for new trial that
arise solely in the context of post trial proceedings must
be presented to the trial court for consideration by a
motion for new trial, and the failure to do so deprives the
appellate court from any record that is reviewable for
error.”).
2
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This contention misrepresents the law, however.

This

Court’s ruling on the immunity issue is supported by the
decisions of several United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals and district court cases and, in fact, represents
the weight of authority.
The principal precedent is the en banc decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).

See Jones, 840 F. Supp.2d at 1000-11.

There, the

Ninth Circuit held that a website did not enjoy CDA
immunity for posting a questionnaire and requiring answers
to it which were alleged to violate federal and state
housing discrimination laws, because such acts constituted
the “creation or development of information” and thus made
the site an “information content provider” within the scope
of 47 U.S.C. § 2309(c) and (f)(3).

Roommates, 521 F.3d at

1164-69.
Following remand and a decision on the merits of the
underlying statutory housing claims, another appeal was
taken.

In the resulting opinion, the Ninth Circuit

acknowledged and left undisturbed its prior CDA ruling,
although it held that the website had not violated the
housing statutes in question.

See Fair Housing Council of
3
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San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216
(9th Cir. 2012).2
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit,
speaking for a panel of that court, emphasized that the CDA
does not provide “a grant of comprehensive immunity from
civil liability for content provided by a third party.”
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).

While

finding the website “craigslist” to be entitled to CDA
immunity in that case, the Court noted that “[n]othing in
the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any
particular listing or express a preference for
discrimination.”

Id. at 671-72.

Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer

Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
(holding that distributors of software that enables file
sharing through peer-to-peer networks can be liable for
contributory copyright infringement if system is designed
to enable and encourage stealing of music).

2

Defendants’ characterization of the Ninth’s Circuit 2012
opinion in Roommates is thus seriously misleading. See
Doc. 177 at 2 n. 1 (stating that because the second
Roommates appeal was terminated in the website’s favor, it
“demonstrate[es] that the prior ruling denying CDA immunity
to the website owner in that case was incorrect.”). As
noted, the Court held in defendants’ favor on grounds
wholly unrelated to CDA immunity and implicitly re-affirmed
its prior opinion.
4
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has upheld application
of CDA immunity but, in doing so, observed that its ruling
was based on the fact that “the record contains no evidence
that [the internet service provider] designed its website
to be a portal for defamatory material or [did] anything to
induce defamatory postings.”

Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d

785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010).
The Tenth Circuit also has held that a website could
not claim immunity under the CDA if it was “responsible for
the development of the specific content that was the source
of the alleged liability.”

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch

Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).

Moreover, that

Court held that one is not “responsible” for “developing”
allegedly actionable information only “if one’s conduct was
neutral with respect to the offensiveness of the content.”
Id. at 1199.
Thus, although Courts have stated generally that CDA
immunity is broad, the weight of the authority teaches that
such immunity may be lost.

That is, a website owner who

intentionally encourages illegal or actionable third-party
postings to which he adds his own comments ratifying or
adopting the posts becomes a “creator” or “developer” of
that content and is not entitled to immunity.

See, e.g.,

Hare v. Richie, Civil Action No. ELH-11-3488, 2012 WL
5
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3773116, at *19 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2012) (noting that “the
appellate case law regarding § 230(c)(1) contemplates that
a website operator may be deprived of immunity if it
‘designed its website to be a portal for defamatory
material.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792
(8th Cir. 2010)).3

3

See also Hare, 1012 WL 3773116, at *17 (noting that
“Dirty World’s involvement goes beyond mere editorial
functions and extends to the creation of its own content –
specifically, Mr. Richie’s comments at the end of each
post”); S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, No. 11-CV-00392, 2012 WL
3335284, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (distinguishing
facts of case from this matter because there “[d]efendants
neither adopted or encouraged further development of the
post”); Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. QIP Holder LLC, Civil
Action No. 3:06-cv-1710 (VLB), 2010 WL 669870, at *24 (D.
Conn. Feb. 19, 2010) (denying motion for summary judgment
because defendants may “have gone further and actively
participated in creating or developing the third-party
content submitted to the [defendants’] website”); Certain
Approval Programs, L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures L.L.C., No.
CV08-1608-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 596582, at *1-3 (D. Ariz. Mar.
9, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss because plaintiffs’
allegations that defendants “actively solicit defamatory
content from third parties and directly encourage the use
of hyperbole and exaggeration” to maximize marketability of
false reports make it plausible that defendants are
“information content provider” under the CDA)3; MCW, Inc. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., No. Civ. A.3:02-CV-2727-G,
2004 WL 833595, at *8 (N.D. Tex. April 19, 2004) (“Section
230(c) immunity is not so broad as to extend to an
interactive computer service that goes beyond the
traditional publisher’s role and takes an active role in
creating or developing the content at issue.”); Hill v.
Stubhub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(noting that CDA analysis by this Court in this matter is
“similar to that deemed appropriate in Accusearch and
Roommates.”); Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126, 133-34
(N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing grant of summary judgment
6
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The cases cited by defendants are entirely
distinguishable because none involve facts where a website
contributed to the development of actionable content by
adding its own comments implicitly adopting an offensive
posting and encouraging similar posts.

As noted above,

Courts faced with such factual allegations have denied
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment based on CDA
immunity.4
B.

The Text and Purpose of the CDA are Contrary to
Defendants’ Interpretation.
Even a cursory reading of the CDA reveals that

affording immunity on the facts of this case would be
inconsistent with the Act’s purpose.
The Act’s subtitle is “Protection for blocking and
screening of offensive material.”

47 U.S.C. § 230.

Among

the stated purposes of the statute are:

because defendant requested potentially defamatory material
and contributed her own thoughts to the overall post).
4

Thus, defendants’ statement in their brief that CDA cases
other than the one at bar “were all resolved by dispositive
motion, approximately 99% in favor of the defendant” is
misleading. For example, the docket in Certain Approval
Programs, L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures L.L.C., No. CV081608-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 596582 (D. Ariz. Mar. 9, 2009),
reflects that the case was not resolved on dispositive
motions. Rather, after the Court denied the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the non-defaulting defendants settled.
(Doc. 73). The docket also reflects that defendants’
counsel was defense counsel in that case and would be aware
of this fact.
7
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(4) to remove disincentives for the development and
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents to restrict their children’s
access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking and harassment by means of
computer.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4), (5).

See Zeran v. America Online,

Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Another important
purpose of § 230 was to encourage service providers to
self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over
their services.”).
The title of the subsection where the immunity
language appears is “Protection for ‘good samaritan’
blocking and screening of offensive material.”
230(c).

47 U.S.C. §

A subsequent subsection requires a website to

notify customers of available filtering devices “that may
assist the customer in limiting access to material that is
harmful to minors.”

47 U.S.C. § 230(d).

subsection (e)(3) provides:

Further,

“Nothing in this section shall

be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State
law that is consistent with this section.”
Thus, defendants’ proffered interpretation of CDA
immunity would distort the intent of Congress in passing
this Act and allow it to be used to subvert the law of

8
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defamation which has existed at common law for centuries,
as well as the laws protecting the right of privacy which
were evolved by the courts in the last century.

See

Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164 (“The Communications Decency
Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the
Internet.”).5
In the view of this Court, the Act’s text indicates
that it was intended only to provide protection for site
owners who allow postings by third parties without
screening them and those who remove offensive content.

If,

however, the owners, as in the instant case, invite
invidious postings, elaborate on them with comments of
their own, and call upon others to respond in kind, the
immunity does not apply.
C.

The Evidence in this Case Demonstrates That Richie
Played a Significant Role in Adopting and Developing
Actionable Content.
The evidence elicited on discovery and in both trials

showed, as the jury found by clear and convincing evidence6,
that defendants here received postings on their website
5

See Jeffrey Blevins, Court Decision Cautions Us to Care
for the Truth, The Enquirer, Aug. 4, 2013, at F6
(“[C]oncerns remain about commercial online services that
put all of the responsibility for ethical conduct on their
users, while accepting none of the blame themselves.”).

6

Although the Court held that plaintiff was not a “public
figure,” it instructed the jury to use the “public figure”
test in an excess of caution.
9
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which would be actionable even by a public figure, i.e.,
that they were knowingly false or in reckless disregard for
the truth.
Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that
these postings and others like them were invited and
encouraged by the defendants by using the name “Dirty.com”
for the website and inciting the viewers of the site to
form a loose organization dubbed “the Dirty Army,” which
was urged to have “a war mentality” against anyone who
dared to object to having their character assassinated.
Specifically, defendant Richie added his own comments
to the defamatory posts concerning plaintiff.

For example,

on December 7, 2009, a third-party posted, under a large
photo of plaintiff:
Nik, here we have Sarah J, captain cheerleader of the
playoff bound cinci bengals . . Most ppl see Sarah as
a gorgeous cheerleader AND highschool teacher . . yes
she’s also a teacher . . but what most of you don’t
know is . . Her ex Nate . . cheated on her with over
50 girls in 4 yrs . . in that time he tested positive
for Chlamydia Infection and Gonorrhea . . so im sure
Sarah also has both . . whats worse is he brags about
doing sarah in the gym . . football field . . her
class room at the school she teaches at DIXIE Heights.
(Doc. 64-2 at 32).

To this, Richie added his own tagline,

in bold: “Why are all high school teachers freaks in the
sack? – nik.”

(Id.).

The tagline and original message

appear on one page as a single story.

10
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Thus, Richie’s conduct cannot be said to have been
“neutral with respect to the offensiveness of the content,”
such that he is not “responsible” for it within the meaning
of § 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).

Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.

Defendants also argue that the fact that plaintiff
ultimately declined to pursue this tagline as an
independently-actionable statement alters this analysis and
makes these facts “identical” to those in S.C. v. Dirty
World, LLC, No. 11-CV-00392, 2012 WL 3335284, at *5 (W.D.
Mo. Mar. 12, 2012).

(Doc. 177 at 16-17).

Defendants are mistaken, for the salient point about
Richie’s tagline is not that it was defamatory itself and
thus outside CDA immunity, but rather that it effectively
ratified and adopted the defamatory third-party post.
Court in S.C. recognized exactly this point.

The

Id. at *5.

As the S.C. Court further noted, Richie made other
comments which encouraged further defamatory posts
concerning plaintiff, such as: “I love how the DIRTY ARMY
has war mentality;” “Never try to battle the DIRTY ARMY;”
and “You dug your own grave here Sarah.”

Following these

comments, an additional defamatory post was made on the
site on January 9, 2010, accusing plaintiff of “sle[eping]
with every other Bengals Football player.”
30).
11

(Doc. 64-2 at
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It is clear, therefore, that Richie did far more than
just allow postings by others or engage in editorial or
self-regulatory functions.

Rather, he played a significant

role in “developing” the offensive content such that he has
no immunity under the CDA, per the precedents discussed
above.
The jury properly found that this conduct justified an
award of punitive damages under the stringent requirements
of KRS 411.184, which requires a showing of “oppression,
fraud or malice” for all punitive damage awards.

This 12th day of August, 2013.

12

